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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Mark

Charles Wilson appeals from his judgment 0f conviction for unlaWﬁJI possession of

He

a ﬁrearm by a felon, enhanced because he had two 0r more prior felony convictions.
that the district court erred

by

failing t0 grant his

motion for judgment of

acquittal

argues

on the

underlying charge and, independently, that the evidence was insufﬁcient 0n the enhancement.

Of The

Statement

Facts

On March 24,
woman

to kill the

And Course Of The Proceedings

2018,

with

Mark

whom

Charles Wilson borrowed a riﬂe from a neighbor and used t0

he was

(PSI, pp. 5-6.)

living.

In a separate criminal case, Custer

County case number CR-2018-0094, Wilson was charged with and convicted of murder.
5768.1)

3; R., pp.

who

it

In this case, the state separately alleged that

(PSI, p.

Wilson was a convicted felon

unlawfully possessed a ﬁrearm in Violation of Idaho Code § 18-3316 on March 24, 2018.

(R., pp. 26-28.)

The

state later

amended

the information to allege that

Wilson was also subject

to

a persistent Violator enhancement, having been convicted in 2006 of battery with intent to

commit a

serious felony in Custer

County case number CR-2005-0803, and of murder

Custer County case number CR-2018-0094.
persistent Violator

the

enhancement arguing

(R., pp. 46-47.)

that his

Wilson moved

in

2019

in

t0 dismiss the

murder conviction could not be used

t0 support

enhancement because the unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm charge was based on Wilson’s

possession 0f the same ﬁrearm on the same day that Wilson used that ﬁrearm to commit the

murder 0f Which he was convicted

1

in 2019.

(R., pp. 57-59.)

With leave 0f the court

(R., pp. 96-

The record 0n appeal contains both a document titled “Clerks Record 47553-2019” and a
document titled “Clerks Record 47553-2019 Amended.” References to “R.” are t0 the latter
document.

amended

97) the state again

the information, this time to

murder conviction and include the allegation
in

Michigan

in

Prior to

1990

trial,

that

remove

the allegation regarding his

Wilson was convicted of felony sexual

assault

(R., pp. 98-99).

Wilson “admitted

to all

of the material elements relating to the charge 0f

Unlawfu1[] Possession of a Firearm with the exception of the element that he previously had

been convicted of a felony” and moved in limine
element.

sole issue

(R., pp. 109-10.)

The

district court

on the ﬁrst part of the

t0 exclude

any evidence not relevant

t0 that

accepted that admission and determined that “the

[concerned with the underlying offense] will be whether

trial

[Wilson] was a felon at the time of the alleged possession.” (TL, p. 52, L. 8 — p. 53, L. 10.) If

Wilson was found

guilty during that ﬁrst phase, a second phase 0f the trial

would address

the

persistent Violator enhancement. (Id.)

During the ﬁrst phase, the

Who had been employed by
(TL, p. 99, L. 15
State’s Exhibit

case

— p.

1,

state

the Custer

114, L. 25.)

presented testimony from one Witness—Levi Maydole,

County

Sheriff’s

Department for around nineteen

Through Deputy Maydole, the

a certiﬁed copy of a Judgment and Order of

number CR-2005-0803 reﬂecting

a

2006 felony conviction

years.

state introduced three exhibits:

Commitment

in Custer

County

for battery with intent to

commit

a serious felony (TL, p. 103, Ls. 11-25; Exs., pp. 1-3); State’s Exhibit 2, a certiﬁed copy of a

Judgment of Sentence and Commitment

t0 Jail issued

by a Michigan

conviction for Criminal Sexual Conduct, 2nd degree (TL, p. 105, L. 15
4-5); and, State’s Exhibit 3, a

court reﬂecting a 1990

—

p. 106, L. 8; Exs., pp.

copy of the then—current Section 750.5200 of the Michigan Penal

Code, deﬁning the crime 0f criminal sexual conduct in the second degree and providing that
a felony (TL, p. 108, L. 6

— p.

109, L. 11; Exs., pp. 7-9)?

that

he was a deputy in Custer County in 2006 and that he knew

Who Wilson was and was aware

then that Wilson was charged and pled guilty as reﬂected in

Deputy Maydole testiﬁed
then

State’s Exhibit

20.)

it is

(TL, p. 101, Ls. 1-8; p. 104, L. 16

1.

He acknowledged that he had n0

(TL, p. 110, L. 23

State’s Exhibit

the

is

When Wilson was

1.

—

Maydole testiﬁed—Without objection—that

felony.

3,

(T12, p. 110, Ls. 5-8.)

way with

p. 114, L.

also stated that the date of birth

0n

—

p.

112, L. 13.)

He acknowledged,

date of birth off 0f the top 0f his head, Without looking at

(TL, p. 112, Ls. 15-23.)

Referring t0 State’s Exhibit

24 —

Wilson provided during the booking process

(TL, p. 111, L. 10

know Wilson’s

reﬂected a conviction for “the same

He

p. 111, L. 5.)

as the date 0f birth

arrested in 2018.

though, that he did not

State’s Exhibit

same

p. 105, L. 11; p. 113, L.

personal involvement in the investigation or prosecution of

that crime, though.

1

—

Mark

With respect

to the

Michigan conviction, Deputy

his investigation indicated that State’s Exhibit 2

Charles Wilson.” (TL, p. 106, L. 10

Deputy Maydole testiﬁed

that the

—

p. 107, L. 5.)

Michigan conviction was

for a

Again, though, he acknowledged that he was not involved in any

the investigation or prosecution 0f the

Michigan crime. (TL,

p. 110, L.

14

—

p. 111, L.

2.)

When

the state ﬁnished presenting

addressed to the underlying charge, Wilson

—

2

p. 116, L. 16.)

He

overruled. (TL, p. 100, L.

On

appeal,

evidence during the ﬁrst phase of the

moved

for a

judgment of acquittal. (TL,

argued that the Michigan statute offered by the

Defense counsel objected

11.)

its

to the

was

p. 115, L.

2

the current version

admission 0f each of these exhibits, but those objections were

21 —p. 103,

L. 23; p. 105, L. 15

Wilson does not argue

(E generally, Appellant’s brief.)

state

trial,

—p. 106,

L. 8; p. 108, L. 6

that the district court erred

—p. 109,

L.

by admitting the exhibits.

of the

statute,

while the conviction was roughly thirty years ago, and so there was insufﬁcient

evidence that the crime of which the defendant in that case was convicted was then a felony, and
that there

was

also insufﬁcient evidence that

defendant in the Michigan case.

The

district court

Wilson was the “Mark Charles Wilson”

that

was

the

(Id.)

held that the evidence as t0 whether Wilson was the defendant in the

Michigan case was sufﬁcient

t0

go the

jury.

whether the conviction was for a felony, the

25 —

(Tr., p. 117, L.

district court

p. 118, L. 9.)

With respect

t0

speculated that that should be a legal

question for the court t0 resolve, not a factual question for the jury. (TL, p. 118, Ls. 10-21.) The

state

endorsed that View, asking the court t0 instruct the jury that the conviction reﬂected in

State’s Exhibit 2

it,

stating that

119, L. 12

—

was

for a felony.

The

district court indicated that

(TL, p. 120, L. 25

— p.

felonies

that,

was

inclined to think that

18-3316 requires a determination Whether the conviction
in

Idaho Code

§

18-310, that

that the jury instruction related t0 the

Instruction

as a jury question.” (TL, p.

Number 23—would

it

was inappropriate

Wilson’s objection

that,

would not permit

even

was

for a

to

is

if

was a

the court to

make

it

was a

the matter

involved, Idaho

comparable

to a list

make

of

that

comparable felony, and determined

charge 0f unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm—Jury

(Tr., p. 122, L.

it

is

ask a jury to

ask the jury only t0 determine whether

convicted in the Michigan case.

would take

it

where a foreign conviction

determination, found that the Michigan conviction

statute

it

it

122, L. 5.)

After a brief recess, the court found

§

Defense counsel opposed

p. 119, L. 9.)

Whether the conviction was for a felony and indicated

under advisement.

Code

—

he does not “know why, but the case law has treated

p. 120, L. 4.)

legal question

(TL, p. 118, L. 22

22 —

it

was Wilson who was

p. 125, L. 19; R., p. 134.)

In response t0

legal question, the current version of the

the

ﬁnding

that the

Michigan

Michigan

statute created a felony

When Wilson was

convicted, the court clariﬁed that

notice 0f the version of the statute in effect

version to

make

its

ﬁnding.

(T12, p. 126, L.

it

had done

when Wilson was
— p.

12

its

own

research, took judicial

convicted, and

was

relying

on

that

127, L. 4.)

Wilson presented no evidence and did not

The jury

(TL, p. 129, Ls. 18-25.)

testify.

returned a guilty verdict on the underlying charge 0f unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm.

(TL, p.

148, Ls. 1-7; R., p. 140.)

The court then turned
enhancement.

Asked by

Jury Instruction

t0 the

the court whether there

Number 31—Which

convicted 0f two prior felonies if
cases reﬂected in State’s Exhibits

parties

second phase 0f the

it

1

trial,

addressed t0 the persistent Violator

was any objection

instructed the jury that

it

t0 instructing the jury

should

ﬁnd

Wilson was

that

found that he was the defendant convicted in the criminal

and

2, the

2006 Idaho case and the 1990 Michigan case—the

responded that there was n0 objection.

(Tr., p. 148, L. 13

—

p. 149, L. 20; R., p. 139.)

Likewise, there was n0 objection t0 the special verdict form, Which asked the jury to

same determination.
Ls. 1-5.)

(R., p. 141.)

The jury found

that

with

Neither party submitted any additional evidence.

Wilson was convicted

in both the Idaho

make

the

(Tr., p. 150,

and Michigan cases.

(T12,

p. 154, Ls. 2-25.)

Roughly ten days
Violator enhancement.

later,

Wilson ﬁled a motion

(R., pp. 144-45, 148-51.)

He

for

judgment 0f acquittal on the

argued that the

persistent

district court erred

When

it

took the question Whether the Michigan conviction was for a felony from the jury and that there

was insufﬁcient evidence

to

show

that

it

was.

(R., pp. 148-51.)

At a hearing on

defense counsel stated “that the Court should not only remand this for a

new

ﬁnding — enter an order of acquittal based on the lack of sufﬁcient evidence
conviction was, in

fact,

a felony.” (TL, p. 160, Ls. 8-21.)

to

trial,

ﬁnd

The prosecutor argued

the motion,

but enter a

that the prior

that there

was

sufﬁcient evidence that the Michigan conviction

was

for a felony,

and so a motion for judgment

0f acquittal should be denied, but speculated the court could possibly construe the motion as for a

new

(Tr., p. 161, L.

trial.

(TL, p. 162, Ls. 6-7.)
conviction

acquittal

was

6

—

The

district court

for a felony should

0n the

Defense counsel did not respond to that suggestion.

p. 162, L. 5.)

determined that the question Whether the Michigan

have been for the jury, denied the motion for judgment of

persistent Violator

enhancement

after

concluding that there was sufﬁcient

evidence for the jury to conclude that the conviction was for a felony, but construed the motion
as requesting the alternative relief of a

p. 162, L. 8

—p. 164,

new trial on the enhancement and

enhancement and reserved the
(T12, p. 178, L.

right to appeal

22 —

p. 181, L. 18.)

years With three years ﬁxed, Which sentence

in Custer

“any and

all

Wilson pled

(TL,

guilty to the

decisions that the Court has

Wilson was sentenced

was ordered

County case number CR-2018-0094.

pp. 167-70.)

relief.

L. 4.)

Prior to the retrial 0f the persistent Violator enhancement,

this point.”

granted that

t0 a

made

to

uniﬁed term of ﬁfteen

t0 run consecutively to his sentence in

(R., pp. 159-62.)

Wilson timely appealed.

(R.,

ISSUES
Wilson
I.

states the issues

Is

on appeal

Mr. Wilson entitled

as:

t0 a judgment

of acquittal 0n the charge of unlawﬁll

possession 0f a ﬁrearm, because the State failed
sufﬁcient evidence that Mr. Wilson

II.

Should

this

Court reverse the

motion for judgment of

present the jury with

was previously convicted 0f a felony?

district

acquittal

[to]

court’s denial of Mr. Wilson’s

0n the

persistent Violator allegation,

because the evidence was insufﬁcient t0 support a ﬁnding that Mr. Wilson

had two prior felony convictions?
(Appellant’s brief, p.

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Wilson

of a ﬁrearm by
a felon should be reversed because the evidence was insufﬁcient for a jury t0 conclude

that

II.

8.)

failed to establish that his conviction for unlawful possession

he was the convicted defendant in either the Idaho or Michigan criminal cases?

Has Wilson

enhancement should be reversed
conclude that he had at least two prior

failed to establish that the persistent Violator

because the evidence was insufﬁcient for a jury to
felony convictions?

ARGUMENT
I.

Afﬁrm Wilson’s Conviction For Unlawful Possession Of A Firearm Because
The Evidence Was Sufﬁcient T0 Establish That Wilson Was The Defendant In The Idaho

This Court Should

Criminal Case

A.

Introduction

Because Wilson conceded that he possessed a ﬁrearm 0n the date in question, the only
factual issue with respect to the charge

0f unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm by a felon—addressed

in the ﬁrst

phase 0f the trial—was Whether Wilson was a felon.

p. 53, L.

10.)

The

state

(R., pp. 109-10; Tr., p. 52, L. 8

—

presented evidence regarding two criminal cases and judgments 0f

conviction with respect to both: a 2006 Idaho conviction for battery with intent to commit a

felony reﬂected in State’s Exhibit

in the

argue,

1,

and a 1990 Michigan conviction for criminal sexual conduct

second degree reﬂected in State’s Exhibit

2.

On

(Exs., pp. 1-5.)

appeal,

Wilson does not

he does with respect to his second issue addressed to the persistent Violator

as

enhancement, that there was insufﬁcient evidence for the jury t0 conclude that the Michigan
conviction

that

was

for a felony, but instead argues only that the evidence

he was the defendant convicted in either case. (Appellant’s

0n the Idaho criminal

Standard

brief, pp. 10-13.)

was a

Focusing only

beyond

felon.

Of Review

“Appellate review of the sufﬁciency of the evidence

is

limited in scope.”

Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 545, 348 P.3d 157, 160 (2015) (internal quotation

omitted).

t0 establish

case, the state presented sufﬁcient evidence for a jury t0 conclude,

a reasonable doubt, that Wilson

B.

was insufﬁcient

“The relevant inquiry

is

not whether this Court would

ﬁnd

marks and

State V.

alterations

the defendant guilty

beyond

a reasonable doubt, but whether after Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Li. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis original). “Thus, the only
inquiry for this Court

have found

is

Whether there

that the State

met

beyond a reasonable doubt.”
if

a reasonable

trier

0f

fact

its

0f innocence,

it

when

upon which a reasonable jury could

burden 0f proving the essential elements 0f the charged crimes

would accept
Li.

“A

it

marks omitted).

and rely upon

it

“Evidence

Li.

in determining

is

substantial

Whether a disputed

conviction can be based primarily upon circumstantial

circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a ﬁnding

Will be sufﬁcient to

inferences 0f guilt.”

substantial evidence

Li. (internal quotation

point 0f fact has been proven.”

evidence, and even

is

uphold a guilty verdict when

it

also gives rise to reasonable

State V. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 790, 391 P.3d 1252,

1260 (2017) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

C.

The Evidence Was Sufﬁcient To Establish That Wilson Was Convicted Of A Felony
Idaho In 2006
Wilson was charged and convicted with Violating Idaho Code

a felony for a “person
§ 18-33 16(1).

He

Who

admitted that he possessed a ﬁrearm, leaving the only question Whether he had

he has been convicted of one of the offenses

list

statute, a

listed in

The jury was

instructed that they should

person

is

“convicted of a felony” if

Idaho Code § 18-310. LC. § 18-3316(2).

includes convictions for battery with intent to

3 10(2)(d).

it

has previously been convicted of a felony” t0 possess a ﬁrearm. I.C.

been “convicted of a felony.” For purposes of that

That

18-33 16, which makes

§

In

commit a

ﬁnd Wilson

serious felony.

guilty if he

convicted of battery With intent to commit a serious felony in Idaho,

is

instructed

on

18-

had previously been

or, alternatively, if

been convicted of second degree criminal sexual conduct in Michigan.
jury found Wilson guilty. (R., p. 140.) “[W]here the jury

I.C. §

he had

(R., pp. 133-34.)

The

alternative ‘theories’ of

m

the state’s case, a conviction challenged for sufﬁciency 0f the evidence Will be upheld if there

on

substantial evidence t0 support the verdict

m,

either

119 Idaho 285, 288, 805 P.2d 491, 494

conviction, there

The

is

(Ct.

one of the theories alleged.”

Looking only

App. 1991).

is

t0 the Idaho

sufﬁcient evidence t0 support the jury’s verdict.

state introduced a certiﬁed

copy of a Judgment and Order 0f Commitment

in Custer

County case number CR-2005-0803 reﬂecting the 2006 felony conviction 0f a defendant named

“Mark Charles Wilson”

for battery With intent t0

commit a

On appeal, Wilson argues

p. 103, L. 23; EXS., pp. 1-3.)

that the state failed t0

Charles Wilson charged in this Custer County case was the same
in that Custer

same name

Mark

show

that the

—

Mark

Charles Wilson convicted

County case because “‘a certiﬁed copy 0f a judgment 0f conviction bearing the

as the defendant, with nothing more, is insufﬁcient t0 establish the identity of the

person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.
V._Ish, 161

(TL, p. 100, L. 21

serious felony.

Idaho 823, 825, 391 P.3d

1,

3 (Ct.

999

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (quoting

App. 2014)).) But,

2006 case involved a defendant with the same

full

m

in addition t0 the fact that the

name who was

convicted in the same small

county, the state provided considerably more.3

First,

Deputy Maydole, Who has been employed With the Custer County Sheriffs

Department since 2001, identiﬁed Wilson
in

2005 and 2006, and

that

in court

and testiﬁed

that

he personally knew Wilson

he was aware then that Wilson was charged With a Violent felony,

pled guilty, and was sentenced in association With that crime, Which he testiﬁed was the crime

reﬂected in State’s Exhibit
113, L. 24

3

—

p.

114 — L.

1.

19.)

(Tr., p. 99, L.

Ls. 3-8; p. 139, L.

—

p. 101, L. 7; p. 104, L.

Second, Deputy Maydole also testiﬁed that

There was n0 dispute below that Wilson’s
23 —p. 140,

19

ﬁlll

L. 2.)

10

name

is

16 — p. 105, L.

when he

8; p.

arrested

“Mark Charles Wilson.” (TL,

and

p. 100,

booked Wilson

in 2018,

(TL, p. 113, Ls. 4-8.)

Wilson acknowledged

booked him

in 2018.

suggest that he

was not

1

he was not allowed t0 possess a ﬁrearm.

Deputy Maydole testiﬁed

Third,

reﬂected 0n State’s Exhibit

that

was

the

that

he recognized that the date of birth

same date 0f birth Wilson provided when Deputy Maydole

(TL, p. 111. L. 10

—

Wilson provided n0 evidence

112, L. 13.)

p.

the defendant in the Idaho case.

That

is

substantial evidence

t0

by which a

reasonable jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Wilson was the defendant in the

2006 conviction.
In arguing otherwise,

Deputy Maydole’s

credibility.

applicable legal standards.

Wilson asks

this

Court to reweigh the evidence and reevaluate

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-13.)

State V. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558,

where a defendant stands convicted, the evidence

appeal,

the prosecution and the reviewing court

is

is

This argument

is

contrary to the

929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996) (“‘On

Viewed

in the light

precluded from substituting

its

most favorable

judgment

to

for that of the

jury as t0 the credibility of witnesses, the weight 0f the evidence and the reasonable inferences t0

be drawn from the evidence.” (quoting State

622

(Ct.

V. Gardiner,

127 Idaho 156, 163, 898 P.2d 615,

App. 1995))).

With respect

was aware then

that

to

Deputy Maydole’s testimony

that

he knew Wilson in 2005 and 2006 and

he was charged with and convicted 0f a Violent felony, Wilson claims that

Deputy Maydole acknowledged

that

he was not personally involved in the investigation and

prosecution 0f that crime. (Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (citing Tr., p. 102, Ls. 14-24.).) While that

so,

it

in

no way negates the

fact that

he knew Wilson, the county and the department were small,

he was aware then 0f the prosecution and
criminal history.

is

(TL, p. 104, L. 16

—

p.

its

outcome, and he had since reviewed Wilson’s

105, L. 11.)

While Wilson might have pressed a

hearsay objection below which he could have then pursued on appeal, he

11

is

challenging only the

sufﬁciency 0f the evidence and review 0f the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence concerns the evidence
the fact-ﬁnder actually heard.

(Ct.

App. 2007) (ﬁnding

E

State V. Williamson, 144 Idaho 597, 601, 166 P.3d 387, 391

that evidence, including evidence that

was arguably

hearsay,

sufﬁcient t0 support guilty verdict). Sufﬁciency 0f the evidence review does not provide a

to litigate the admissibility

admissibility 0f

was

means

of evidence that the defendant did not object t0 below and the

E

Which the appellant has not made an issue on appeal.

Idaho 707, 462 P.3d 1171, 1174 (2020) (holding that a party

State V. Hess, 166

may not transform

sufﬁciency 0f the

evidence review into a review 0f the admission of un-obj ected to evidence).

With respect
conviction

birth,

is

t0

Deputy Maydole’s testimony that the date of birth of the defendant Whose

reﬂected on State’s Exhibit l—July 30, 1964—is the same as Wilson’s date 0f

Wilson contends

recollection, of

that

Mr. Wilson’s birthdate” but instead testiﬁed

birthdate only because

‘I

read

booking him.”’ (Appellant’s

Maydole

said

Deputy Maydole “conceded he had n0 personal knowledge, or

is

Wilson provided

that

it

it

When he was

brief, pp.

he did not

112, Ls. 15-17.)

0n the [2018] charge because

birth date “off the top

When Deputy Maydole booked him
trial in this case.

Wilson complains 0n appeal

admitted as evidence.” (Appellant’s

he “‘knew’ Mr. Wilson’s

12-13 (quoting Tr. p. 111, Ls. 19-21).)

know Wilson’s

Wilson’s criminal history prior to the
p.

arrested

that

brief, p. 13.)

in 2018,

0f

[his]

I

was

What Deputy
head,” but that

and Deputy Maydole reviewed

(Tr., p. 105, Ls. 9-1 1; p. 111, Ls.

that “there is

Though

the one

10-21;

n0 2018 booking information

that is true,

it

again provides, at best,

grounds for a potential hearsay objection below and a potential appellate issue regarding the
admissibility of that testimony, one that

review, the jury

was permitted

Wilson has not pursued.

t0 rely

On

sufﬁciency 0f the evidence

0n Deputy Maydole’s testimony regarding booking

information provided by Wilson and his subsequent conﬁrmation that the birth date provided by

12

Wilson during booking was the same

conﬁrmed

as the birth date provided

pretrial that the birth dates

on

Exhibit

Because the jury could reasonably infer

that

it

When he

was Wilson’s

testiﬁed at

birth date

on

trial is

State’s

could reasonably conclude that he was the defendant convicted in that case.

1, it

State V. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 569,

date 0f birth

Having

1.

on the judgment and the booking information were the

same, Whether Deputy Maydole had Wilson’s birth date memorized
irrelevant.

State’s Exhibit

300 P.3d 1046, 1057 (2013) (holding

that

E

same name and

was sufﬁcient evidence of identity).
Wilson does not address Deputy Maydole’s testimony

Finally,

that

Wilson told him

during booking that he was not permitted to possess a ﬁrearm.

Taken
conclude—as

together,

this

the

one did—that Wilson was the convicted defendant

addition to his having the

county, Deputy

evidence was more than sufﬁcient for a reasonable jury t0

same full-name

as that defendant,

Maydole personally knew Wilson

in

2006 Idaho

in the

and facing

trial in

2005 and 2006, knew

that

the

case.

In

same small

he was charged

with a Violent crime in 2005 and convicted in 2006, reviewed Wilson’s criminal record,

conﬁrmed

that the birthdate provided

by Wilson during booking was

the birthdate 0f the

defendant in the 2006 case, and Wilson stated during booking that he was not permitted to
possess ﬁrearms. While

some of that evidence may be

circumstantial, “even

evidence could be interpreted consistently with a ﬁnding of innocence,

uphold a guilty verdict When
Idaho

at

it

it

when
Will

circumstantial

be sufﬁcient

also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt.”

t0

Sm_ith, 161

790, 391 P.3d at 1260 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This evidence at

least gives rise t0 a reasonable inference that

Wilson was a felon

13

as 0f 2006.

II.

Wilson Has Not Shown That The District Court Should Have Granted
On The Persistent Violator Enhancement
A.

A Judgment Of Acquittal

Introduction

After Wilson was convicted 0f the underlying offense 0f unlawful possession of a

ﬁrearm, the

district court

Violator enhancement.

turned to the second phase 0f the

trial

concerned With the persistent

Neither party presented any evidence 0r objected t0 the jury instruction

regarding the enhancement or to the verdict form, Which instructed the jury that

Wilson had committed two prior felonies
Idaho and 1990 Michigan cases.

if

it

should ﬁnd

found that he had been convicted in both the 2006

it

(Tr., p. 148, L.

14

— p.

Wilson was

150, L. 5; R., pp. 139, 141.)

convicted 0n the persistent Violator enhancement. (TL, p. 154, Ls. 2-25; R., p. 141.) Following
the verdict, he ﬁled a motion for judgment of acquittal

was required

to speciﬁcally

was insufﬁcient evidence

ﬁnd

that that the

for the jury t0

denied the motion, but ordered a
required t0

On

ﬁnd that the Michigan
appeal,

Wilson argues

new

Michigan conviction was

d0

that the jury

and

The

that there

district court

concluding that the jury should have been

after

was

for a felony

(R., pp. 144-45, 148-51.)

so.

trial

conviction

on the enhancement arguing

for a felony. (Tr., p. 162, L. 8

that the district court erred

0f acquittal because there was insufﬁcient evidence,

by denying

ﬁrst, for the jury to

his

— p.

164, L. 4.)

motion for judgment

conclude that he was the

convicted defendant in both the 2006 Idaho case and the 1990 Michigan case, and, second, for
the jury to conclude that the relevant

Michigan

statute created a felony rather than a

misdemeanor

offense. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-18.)

Wilson’s argument regarding the sufﬁciency of the evidence as t0 the identity of the
defendant(s) in those cases fails for several reasons.

argument because the

district court

did not address

14

it

First,

Wilson has not preserved any such

and, having pled guilty to the enhancement,

Wilson preserved only the

right t0 appeal the district court’s determinations.

Second, as

discussed above, the evidence adequately supports the jury’s determination that Wilson was the

defendant in the Idaho case, the Michigan judgment includes the same
the defendant in the Idaho case, and the jury

was

name and

therefore entitled to infer that

date of birth as

Wilson was the

defendant in the Michigan case as well.
Likewise, With respect t0 Whether the Michigan statute created a felony or misdemeanor
offense, Wilson’s argument

review

is

on appeal

fails for several reasons.

First,

sufﬁciency 0f the evidence

addressed t0 whether the evidence was sufﬁcient in light of the instructions the jury

actually received.

The

relevant instruction and verdict form instructed the jury that

Wilson had been convicted 0f two felonies

if

it

it

could ﬁnd

found that he had been convicted in both the

Idaho and Michigan cases and asked the jury t0 determine whether he was convicted in those

Wilson did not object prior

cases.

instructional error as an issue

error.

was sufﬁcient
so

t0 support a

was sufﬁcient

enhancement

t0 the jury, did not preserve

on appeal, and does not argue on appeal

follows that the evidence

It

t0 submitting the

ﬁnding

was

sufﬁcient.

that the relevant

that the instruction

was

Second, the evidence presented by the state

Michigan

statute created a felony offense,

and

for the jury t0 conclude that Wilson’s conviction for Violating the statute

constituted a felony.

Standard

B.

Of Review

“Appellate review of the sufﬁciency of the evidence

Idaho

at

inquiry

limited in scope.”

545, 348 P.3d at 160 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

is

Whether

is

not whether this Court would

after

ﬁnd

Viewing the evidence in the

the defendant guilty

light

most favorable

15

Eliasen, 158

“The relevant

beyond a reasonable doubt, but

t0 the prosecution,

any

rational

trier

of fact could have found the essential elements 0f the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Li

(internal quotation

Whether there
State

met

doubt.”

its

Li

is

marks omitted) (emphasis

“Thus, the only inquiry for this Court

upon Which a reasonable jury could have found

substantial evidence

is

that the

burden of proving the essential elements 0f the charged crimes beyond a reasonable

(internal quotation

0f fact would accept
proven.”

original).

Li “A

it

marks omitted).

and rely upon

it

“Evidence

Li.

in determining

is

substantial if a reasonable trier

Whether a disputed point of fact has been

conviction can be based primarily upon circumstantial evidence, and even

circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a ﬁnding of innocence,

sufﬁcient t0 uphold a guilty verdict

When

it

it

When

will

be

also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt.”

Smith, 161 Idaho at 790, 391 P.3d at 1260 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

C.

Wilson Has Not Shown That His Conviction As A Persistent Violator Should Be
Reversed Because There Was Insufﬁcient Evidence He Was The Defendant In The Two
Prior Criminal Cases

Wilson Has Not Preserved Any Argument That The Evidence Was Insufﬁcient T0
Establish That He Was The Defendant In The Two Criminal Cases

1.

Wilson has not preserved any argument

that,

for purposes of the persistent Violator

enhancement, there was insufﬁcient evidence that he was the defendant in the two criminal cases
because he never made such an argument and so the
the failure t0

make

district court

never addressed

it.

Generally,

a sufﬁciency 0f the evidence argument below would not prevent an appellant

from challenging the sufﬁciency of the evidence

for the ﬁrst time

0n appeal.

Here, though,

Wilson’s conviction 0n the persistent Violator enhancement was entered on a guilty plea. (TL,
180, L. 13

—

p.

181, L. 16.)

jurisdictional defects.

Clark

The entry of a
V. State,

valid guilty plea constitutes a waiver of

92 Idaho 827, 832, 452 P.2d 54, 59 (1969).

16

all

An

p.

non-

appeal

from a non—jurisdictional defect
to I.C.R. 11(a)(2),

With

is

preserved only by entering a conditional guilty plea pursuant

which provides:

the approval 0f the court and the consent 0f the prosecuting attorney, a

defendant

may

enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right,

on

appeal from the judgment, to review any speciﬁed adverse ruling. If the defendant
prevails

on appeal, the defendant must be allowed

Wilson entered a conditional plea reserving the
Court has made to

this point.”

t0

Withdraw defendant's

right t0 appeal

(TL, p. 178, L. 24

—

p. 179, L.

“any and

all

plea.

decisions that the

4 (emphasis added).) But Wilson

never argued that the persistent Violator enhancement should be dismissed because the

state

presented insufﬁcient evidence that Wilson was the defendant in the Idaho and Michigan
criminal cases and so the district court did not

Wilson made two motions

for

make

a decision with respect to that issue.

judgment of acquittal

in this case,

the trial addressed t0 the underlying charge 0f unlawful possession of a

—

p. 117, L. 24),

and another

t0 the persistent Violator

after

one in the ﬁrst phase of

ﬁrearm (TL,

p. 115, L.

22

he was convicted on the underlying charge that was addressed

enhancement

(R., pp. 144, 148-51).

Because Wilson

is

challenging the

sufﬁciency 0f the evidence that he was the defendant in the Idaho and Michigan criminal cases
for purposes of the persistent Violator enhancement,

relevant here. That motion does not argue that there

Who was
there

it is

the denial of the latter motion that

was insufﬁcient evidence

convicted in both the Idaho and Michigan criminal cases.

was insufﬁcient evidence

that the

Michigan conviction was for a felony.

Wilson made the same limited argument
161, L. 4.)

Instead,

at the

hearing 0n his motion.

that

it

it

is

was Wilson

argues only that

(R., pp. 148-51.)

(TL, p. 159, L. 13

—

p.

Thus, With respect t0 the persistent Violator enhancement, Wilson never argued that

the evidence

was insufﬁcient

for the jury to conclude that

17

he was the defendant in the two

criminal cases, the district court did not address any such argument, and he has not preserved any

such determination as an issue on appeal.

When Wilson made

Further, even

motion for judgment of

his ﬁrst

underlying charge during the ﬁrst of phase 0f the

trial

acquittal

0n the

he did not argue that there was insufﬁcient

evidence that he was the defendant in the Idaho criminal case, though he did argue that there was
insufﬁcient evidence that he

—

p. 116, L. 11.)

was

The

was

the defendant in the

district court

the defendant in the

Michigan criminal

case.

(TL, p. 115, L. 22

never addressed the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence that Wilson

2006 Idaho case

at

any

stage, either

with respect to the underlying

charge or the persistent Violator enhancement, because Wilson never asked the court t0 do

While the

district court

Michigan

case,

it

addressed the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence that he was the defendant in the

did so in the context of a phase of the

trial

addressed to the underlying charge

0f unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm, not the persistent Violator enhancement. Even
for

so.

judgment 0f acquittal during the ﬁrst phase 0f the

trial is

if the

motion

construed as a motion for judgment

0f acquittal as to the persistent Violator enhancement, though the court had not even taken the

enhancement up
that

yet,

Wilson

still

did not argue even there that there

was insufﬁcient evidence

he was the defendant in the Idaho case.

Because the

district

court

was not asked

to

make any

determination regarding the

sufﬁciency of the evidence that Wilson was the defendant in the Idaho and Michigan cases for

purposes 0f the persistent Violator enhancement,
decision preserved for review

by

it

did not d0 so and there

the plea agreement.

is

no adverse ruling 0r

Even assuming, arguendo,

that the district

court’s consideration 0f the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence regarding the identity of the

defendant during the ﬁrst phase 0f the

trial

Michigan

preserved that issue for purposes 0f the persistent

18

Violator

enhancement

in the

second phase 0f the

trial,

the identity of the defendant in the Idaho criminal case

was not addressed

at all.

Sufﬁcient Evidence Supports The Jurv’s Finding That Wilson

2.

In

Even
identity

the sufﬁciency of the evidence regarding

if

Was The Defendant

Both The Idaho And Michigan Criminal Cases

Wilson had argued below

that there

was insufﬁcient evidence regarding

the

of the defendant in the Idaho and Michigan criminal cases to support the persistent

Violator enhancement, the evidence

sufﬁcient t0 support the jury’s ﬁnding that he

is

was

the

defendant in both cases.

To

establish that

Wilson was a

convicted of at least two felonies.

persistent Violator, the state

As

had

t0

show

that

Wilson was

discussed above in reference t0 the sufﬁciency 0f the

evidence 0n the underlying charge, the evidence was sufﬁcient to support the jury’s conclusion

that

Wilson was the defendant convicted

State’s Exhibit 2, the

(Exs., pp.

2006 Idaho case and was therefore a

felon.

Michigan judgment, includes the same full-name, “Mark Charles Wilson,”

and the same date of birth,
case.

in the

1, 4.)

as the Idaho

Having concluded

that

judgment provides

for the defendant in that

Wilson was the defendant Whose conviction was

reﬂected in the Idaho judgment, a reasonable jury could also conclude that he was the defendant

Whose conviction was reﬂected
infer

from the

fact that

in the

Michigan judgment.

Wilson was the defendant

That

is

in the Idaho case that the date

Idaho judgment was Wilson’s date of birth. The jury then had before

Which had Wilson’s

was

the defendant

ﬁlll

name and

the

so because the jury could

it

the

Michigan judgment,

same date of birth. So, the jury could

Whose conviction was reﬂected on

19

the

0f birth 0n the

Michigan judgment.

infer that

E

Wilson

Patton, 154

Idaho

at

name and

569, 300 P.3d at 1057 (holding that the defendant’s

copy of judgment 0f conviction was sufﬁcient

date 0f birth

t0 establish that defendant

was

on certiﬁed

the convicted

person).

Wilson Has Not Shown That His Conviction As A Persistent Violator Should Be
Reversed Because There Was Insufﬁcient Evidence That The Michigan Conviction Was
For A Felony

D.

In Light

1.

Of The Unobiected-To

Persistent Violator

Jurv’s Verdict

Conviction

Whether Or Not

Was

Jury Instruction

And Verdict Form Regarding The
Was Sufﬁcient To Support The

Enhancement, The Evidence

For

It

Was

Sufﬁcient

T0

Establish That

The Michigan

A Felony

After Wilson was convicted of the underlying charge 0f unlawﬁll possession of a ﬁrearm,

the court

began the second phase 0f the

trial

concerned With the persistent Violator enhancement.

Prior t0 submitting the matter to the jury, the district court asked the parties if there

obj ection to the court instructing the jury with Jury Instruction

to the

to

enhancement. (TL,

ﬁnd

that the Idaho

objection.

that

p. 149, Ls. 5-20.)

3

l—the

instruction addressed

That instruction did not require the jury speciﬁcally

and Michigan convictions were for

(T12, p. 149, Ls. 5-20.)

N0.

was any

felonies.

Wilson had no

(R., p. 139.)

Likewise, there was n0 objection t0 the special verdict form

asked the jury to determine only Whether Wilson was convicted 0f the offenses, not Whether

they constituted felonies. (R., p. 141.)

On

appeal,

Wilson frames the issue regarding the

persistent Violator

involving the sufﬁciency of the evidence, arguing that the “evidence

is

enhancement as

legally insufﬁcient t0

support a ﬁnding that in 1990, criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, was deﬁned as a
felony under Michigan law.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) That

was not sufﬁcient

to permit the jury to

ﬁnd

that, in

is,

Wilson argues

that the evidence

1990, the Michigan statute addressed t0

criminal sexual conduct in the second degree created a felony offense—even if

20

it

did so at the

time 0f trial—and so was insufﬁcient t0 show that Wilson’s Violation of that statute then
constituted a felony.

But “the sufﬁciency of the evidence must be determined based upon the

jury instructions given, not upon those that should have been given.”

Idaho 857, 867 n.6, 292 P.3d 248, 258 n.6 (2012);

Q,

ﬂ

also Mosell Equities,

154 Idaho 269, 275, 297 P.3d 232, 238 (2013) (“Where there

instructions, the sufﬁciency

instructions.”).

“That

is

154 Idaho

at

because the jury

which Wilson did not
the Idaho and

at

238.

is to

to the jury

was asked only

was sufﬁcient

whether or not

it

to support the verdict

Mosell Equities, LLC,

In the instruction and verdict form actually given, and to

t0 determine

Michigan offenses, not Whether they constituted

persistent Violator

&

apply the law as set forth in the jury instructions to

set forth in the jury instructions.”

object, the jury

instructions, the evidence

153

V. Berrvhill

no objection

Whether the evidence was sufﬁcient

depend upon the law as
275, 297 P.3d

is

LLC

V. Forte,

of the evidence t0 support a verdict must be based upon the jury

the facts in order to reach the verdict.

Will therefore

Bolognese

whether Wilson committed

felonies.

In light 0f those

to sustain the jury’s determination that

was sufﬁcient

t0 establish that

Wilson was a

second degree criminal sexual

conduct was a felony offense in Michigan in 1990.

Though framed

as a sufﬁciency 0f the evidence issue, Wilson’s

argument would be more

appropriately addressed t0 the propriety of the jury instruction and special verdict form.

Presumably, he has not framed the issue as an objection t0 the jury instruction and verdict form

because he recognizes that that issue has been waived.
objections t0 jury instructions must be

the issue

is

waived by

90 (2016) (holding

failing t0

that

do

so.

made

E

Under Idaho Criminal Rule

“before the jury retires t0 consider

alﬂ

its

State V. Hall, 161 Idaho 413, 422,

30(b)(4),

verdict” and

387 P.3d 81,

“Rule 30(b) required that defense counsel object t0 [alleged instructional

error] during the jury instruction conference

and

21

state distinctly the

grounds 0f the objection,”

and

d0 so constituted a waiver of the

failure to

issue).

In the ﬁrst phase of the

concerned

trial,

with the underlying unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm charge, Wilson did object to one jury
instruction,

Jury Instruction

Number

23,

Which was addressed

t0 the underlying

unlawﬁll

possession 0f a ﬁrearm charge. (TL, p. 131, Ls. 6-13.) Focusing speciﬁcally on that charge, the
district court

denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and overruled Wilson’s objection to

Jury Instruction

Number

foreign conviction

23.

makes

it

(Tr., p. 122, L.

22 —

p. 127, L. 4.)

unlawful for one to possess a ﬁrearm only

offense “comparable” to the offenses listed in Idaho

that

it

was inappropriate

comparable

t0

itself that the

127, L. 4.)

to ask a jury t0

one of those

Under Idaho Code

make

listed offenses, that

the

it

Code

§ 18-310.

conviction

if the

The

is

for an

decided

district court

judgment Whether a foreign offense was

was a

legal question,

and made the ﬁnding

Michigan conviction was for a comparable felony offense. (Tn,

As

§ 18-3316, a

p. 122, L.

a result, and over Wilson’s objection, the court held that Jury Instruction

22 —

p.

Number

23 was adequate Where, in determining Whether Wilson was guilty 0f unlawful possession 0f a
ﬁrearm,

it

instructed the jury t0 determine only whether

Wilson violated the Michigan

not Whether such Violation constituted a felony. (TL, p. 123, L. 13
13.) But, importantly, that determination is not at issue

— p.

124, L. 13; p. 13

brief, pp. 9-13.)

was

1,

and

Ls. 6-

0n appeal. As discussed above, Wilson’s

only argument on appeal regarding his conviction for the underlying offense
sufﬁcient evidence that he

statute

the defendant in either the Idaho or

is

Michigan

whether there was

cases.

(Appellant’s

Wilson’s objection t0 a jury instruction regarding the unlawful possession 0f a

ﬁrearm charge did not somehow

constitute an objection to the verdict

regarding the persistent Violator enhancement.

form or instruction

Thus, the instruction and verdict form with

respect to the persistent Violator enhancement, at issue here, were not objected

22

t0.

Instead,

Wilson attempted

under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.
appropriate

as

challenge

a

t0

to address the issue for the ﬁrst time in a post-verdict

Even assuming

144-45, 148-51.)

(R., pp.

the jury

was

so

instruction,

the

district

was convinced

that the jury should

Michigan conviction was
enhancement. (TL,

have been instructed that

for a felony

and ordered a new

— p.

“When

p. 162, L.

17

164, L. 4.)

incorrect instructions, the appropriate

remedy

is

had

it

court’s

on the

a jury verdict

Transp. C0,, 138 Idaho 108, 111, 58 P.3d 92, 95 (2002);

ﬂ

is

new

remedy.

district court

to speciﬁcally

trial

the granting of a

motion was

that

Notwithstanding Wilson’s failure t0 object t0 the instruction 0r verdict form, the

motion

ﬁnd

that the

persistent Violator

rendered 0n the basis 0f

trial.”

Munns

V.

Swift

also State V. Herrera—Brito, 131

new

Idaho 383, 388, 957 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Ct. App. 1998) (granting

trial

Where

instructions

That rule makes particularly good sense here. Notably,

improperly omitted essential element).

the district court’s invitation for objections to the instruction regarding the persistent Violator

enhancement came before the

0n the enhancement. (TL,
t0 the instruction

whether

a fact that

4

p. 149, L. 5

— p.

and verdict form, the

or

is

150, L. 5.)

state

Had Wilson

could well have

Similarly,

0n the

successful raised an objection

made

a different choice regarding

state’s

motion or sua sponte, the

could have taken judicial notice of the Michigan statute in effect

Michigan conviction.

may

were asked whether they would submit additional evidence

to present additional evidence.4

district court

it

parties

E

I.R.E.

201 (providing that the

district court

at the

time of the

may take judicial

notice of

not subject to reasonable dispute and, in a criminal case, must “instruct the jury that

may

not accept the noticed fact as conclusive”); White

V.

White, 94 Idaho 26, 30, 480

Indeed, the state apparently intended to present additional evidence on the persistent Violator

enhancement

after the district court granted

Wilson a new

record reﬂecting that Wilson unsuccessfully
Tr., p. 168, L. 5

— p.

moved

169, L. 14.)
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trial

and before he pled

t0 exclude that evidence.

guilty,

With the

(R., pp. 156-57;

P.2d 872, 876 (1971) (providing that court

may

m

take judicial notice 0f foreign statutes);

Co_0k, 143 Idaho 323, 328-29, 144 P.3d 28, 33-34 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that evidence ofprior

conviction

was sufﬁcient Where

During the ﬁrst phase of the

trial,

4) and, later, after granting a

intended to do so again

district court

properly took judicial notice of prior guilty plea).

the district court did exactly that (TL, p. 126, L. 19

new

trial

on the

(Tr., p. 169, Ls. 7-12).

— p.

127, L.

persistent Violator enhancement, indicated that

Importantly, Whether the district court could take

judicial notice of the statute is a different question than

Whether the jury was required

determine that the Michigan conviction was a felony. Even

if the

the

Michigan conviction was

it

jury was required t0

ﬁnd

for a felony, the district court could take judicial notice

t0

that

of the

content of the statute at the time of the conviction and allow the jury t0 draw the obvious

inference.

In either event, whether through additional evidence or judicial notice, the state could

have attempted
his chances

t0

meet the burden had Wilson successﬁllly objected.

by declining

t0 object if

an instruction

fails to

A

defendant cannot take

require the jury to

make

a ﬁnding

regarding an essential element, wait for the resulting evidence to be affected by that decision, and
then, after an adverse verdict, secure a judgment

0f acquittal by arguing that there was inadequate

evidence t0 support a ﬁnding regarding the essential element.

Wilson

is

not entitled to a judgment of acquittal based on insufﬁciency 0f the evidence

Where he did not object
sufﬁcient given the

he was entitled even
2.

to the relevant jury instruction or verdict form, the evidence

manner
if there

in

which the jury was

was

instructed,

relief t0

which

instructional error.

The Evidence Was Sufﬁcient That The Michigan Conviction Was For A Felony

Nevertheless, the evidence the state in fact presented

to

and he received the

was

was sufﬁcient

for a reasonable jury

conclude that the Michigan conviction was for a felony. Based on the Michigan judgment, the

24

jury here

knew

in Violation

all

that a

Michigan jury convicted Wilson of second-degree criminal sexual conduct,

0f Michigan Penal Code 750.520c(1)(a), that he was sentenced to a year in jail, with

but two months suspended in favor of two years of probation.

introduced State’s Exhibit

(Exs., p. 4.)

The

state

then

version 0f the Michigan statute in effect at the time 0f trial, that

3, the

deﬁnes second degree criminal sexual conduct as a felony and criminalizes exceptionally serious
conduct, including sexual contact With a person under the age 0f thirteen, M.C.L. 750.5200(1)(a).

(EXS., pp. 7-9.)

Thus, the jury

Wilson offered no evidence regarding Whether the conviction was

knew

Wilson was convicted by a Michigan

that

year 0f incarceration, albeit

and

much of that

made

that

judgment against Wilson criminalized very serious

conduct a felony. That

is

substantial

Which the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,

“A

conviction

may be

he was sentenced to a

period suspended in favor of two years of probation,

that the criminal statute reﬂected in the

criminal conduct and

jury, that

and competent evidence on

that the conviction

based on proof 0f the circumstances and the probable deductions which

judgment of conviction Will not be disturbed 0n appeal where there

of the jury as to

Br_ito,

.

.

.

is

ﬂow

substantial

State V. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 581,

(1981) (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
that

was

based 0n circumstantial evidence, and the conclusion 0f

evidence to support the judgment.”

for a felony.

guilt

may be

therefrom.

A

and competent

634 P.2d 435, 443

This Court “will not substitute

the reasonable inferences t0 be

for a felony.

[its]

drawn from the evidence.”

w

View

for

131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101.

Wilson’s argument to the contrary focuses 0n the fact that State’s Exhibit 3 does not
reﬂect the version of the Michigan statute in effect
convicted, and on the fact that

conviction and the

it

When Wilson committed

indicates that the statute

trial in this case.

was

was amended between Wilson’s

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.)
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the offense and

According

to

Wilson, the

that

possibility

misdemeanor
trial in this

that crime

the

statute

in 1990,

case t0

might have made second degree criminal sexual conduct a

when Wilson was

make

was a felony

that

convicted, but

was then amended sometime before

same offense a felony implies

in 1990.

But, While

(Id.)

it is

the

that the jury could not conclude that

true that the statute

was amended, Wilson

presented no evidence or any reason to believe that second degree criminal sexual conduct was a

misdemeanor

was

in

1990 but was transformed into a felony between then and his

instructed, “[a] reasonable

“The mere

m,

possibility

doubt

is

trial.

not a mere possible 0r imaginary doubt.”

As

the jury

m

(R., p. 122.)

of innocence will not invalidate a guilty verdict on appeal.”

118 Idaho 742, 744, 800 P.2d 138, 140 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that jury could

reasonably infer defendant entered building though witness’s View 0f entry was blocked).
jury could reasonably infer from the very serious nature 0f the conduct criminalized

statute, the

that

it

punishment Wilson received, and the

the

fact that the statute presently creates a felony

did so at the time of Wilson’s conviction in 1990.

As Wilson acknowledges,
that View.

(Ct.

by

The

there

Idaho precedent signiﬁcantly 0n point that supports

(Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) In State V. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 560, 777 P.2d 1226, 1233

App. 1989), the appellant argued

Violator

is

enhancement because the

those in effect

when

state

that the evidence

was insufﬁcient

to support a persistent

introduced the current version 0f the relevant statutes, not

the appellant committed the crimes, and so the state did not “Wholly

eliminate a possibility that the prior crimes were misdemeanors, rather than felonies,

committed them.”

Li

possibility that the

offenses were once misdemeanors

possibility” that the state

The Court of Appeals

was not required

rejected that argument, characterizing the

as

“speculative”

t0 refute t0 carry its burden. Li.
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When he

and an “inchoate

Wilson argues,

ﬁrst, that Sm_ith is distinguishable and, second, that

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.)

First, in Sm_ith, the

He

Court of Appeals noted

district court

that,

by

acknowledged

contrast,

he did

-

But

p.1 10, L.8).)

had been amended

it

in this particular

more than a

possibility does not

possibility” simply because

possibility,

him

in this case.”

of the current version of the statute was a fact
(Appellant’s brief, p. 17 (citing Tr., p.109,

it

way, to turn a misdemeanor into a felony,

said that

not what the

Smith was required to “raise” the issue in defense

and give

less speculative, less inchoate,

it is

is

mentioned. Instead, t0

make

rise t0 reasonable doubt.

A

it

more than a

speculative, inchoate

he needed t0 make a “showing”—provide some evidence 0r any reason t0
at 560,

777

1233. Wilson certainly did not d0 that.

at

Second, in
statutes

m1

the Court 0f Appeals noted that the state introduced “copies 0f the

deﬁning the crimes, along with the

that the state did not

have

statutes’ legislative history.”

“Moreover, as

Li.

After concluding

t0 preemptively rebut the speculative possibility that the statutes

been amended between his conviction and the ﬁnding
stated,

t0

and something more than a “mere

believe—that the statute had been amended in that particular way. Sm_ith, 116 Idaho

P.2d

to raise.”

a portion of the transcript in Which the

speculative, inchoate possibility

become

for

clear that simply raising the speculative possibility that the statute

Court of Appeals meant When
render

were matters of defense

so, citing

that the introduction

it is

that the statutes did not

“However, n0 such issue was framed

for the jury t0 consider in evaluating the evidence.

L.3

Smith thought the judgments were in

were not actually applicable, 0r

560, 777 P.2d at 1233.

at

Wilson claims

Li.

that, “If

as felonies at pertinent times, these

116 Idaho

Sm_ith,

manifestly wrong.

attempts to distinguish Sm_ith in two ways.

error, that the proferred [sic] statutes

deﬁne the crimes

it is

we have

that

had

he was a persistent Violator, the court

noted, the state submitted the legislative history of each pertinent

27

In doing so,

statute.

and

it

That

it

negated any potential defense based on possible statutory amendments,

more than satisﬁed

is,

though

its

ultimate burden of proving the existence of the prior felonies.” Li.

the court held, in the alternative, that the state

it

did not need t0 d0 so.

Li.

According

to

had negated the speculative

Wilson, the legislative history here does not

similarly negate the speculative possibility that the statute

into a felony.

here.

But, regardless,

it is

it is

unclear

how

felony did not create reasonable doubt. That

Apparently recognizing that Sm_ith

18.)

it

to turn a

misdemeanor

it

compares

to the legislative history

clearly an alternative holding, with the primary holding being that the

bare possibility that one or more of the statutes had been

argues that

was amended

Because the Court 0f Appeals did not discuss the

(Appellant’s brief, p. 17.)

content 0f the legislative history in Sm_ith,

possibility,

should be abandoned because

is

amended

t0 turn a

misdemeanor

into a

so here as well.

not meaningfully distinguishable, Wilson next

is

it is

“manifestly wrong.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-

Seizing 0n the Court 0f Appeals’ use 0f the phrase “prima facie,” Wilson argues that the

court impermissibly reduced the state’s burden to establish an essential element and shifted the

burden

What

t0

Smith to disprove an essential element.

the court held

was

that, “in its

(Id.)

That argument misunderstands Sm_ith.

prima facie presentation, the

state

needed only

t0

produce

copies ofjudgments speciﬁcally identifying the crimes as felonies, or-if the judgments were not

so speciﬁc-to offer admissible copies of the felony statutes applicable t0 the crimes recited in the

The Court of Appeals held

judgments.” Sm_ith, 116 Idaho

at

contravening evidence, that

sufﬁcient evidence for a jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable

is

560, 777 P.2d at 1233.

doubt, that the crimes were felonies. That

is

n0

less so

that,

absent

Where, as in Sm_ith and this case, the state

introduces the version 0f the statutes in effect at the time of trial, not the version in effect at the

time of the previous convictions.

That

is

because the mere possibility that the statutes were

28

amended

to turn

misdemeanors

into felonies does not render the evidence insufﬁcient.

So,

Where

the state has submitted felony statutes applicable t0 the crimes recited in the judgments, and the

defendant nevertheless contends that the convictions might not have been for felonies because
the statutes could possibly have been

must present some evidence

make

to

amended
that

to turn

more than a

misdemeanors

into felonies, the defendant

None of this

bare, speculative possibility.

involves shifting a burden to the defendant.

As

burden”

simply recognizes that whether there

always the

is

Li

state’s.

Instead,

it

the court in Sm_ith recognized, the “ultimate

is

sufﬁcient

evidence to support a ﬁnding on a particular element depends on the whole 0f the evidence,
including Whether, in his effort t0 undermine the otherwise adequate evidence the state has

already submitted, the defendant

made any

attempt t0 substantiate What would otherwise be a

purely speculative possibility.

The Michigan

statute criminalizes

very serious sex misconduct, Which

second degree criminal sexual conduct, and Which
There

is

was convicted of

it.

that crime.

make

that

n0 reason

makes a

at all to believe that the offense

The bare

same crime a

it

possibility that

it

felony, does not require a

29

felony.

it

deﬁnes as

Wilson was convicted 0f

was a misdemeanor when Wilson

was, and then was subsequently amended t0

ﬁnding

that the evidence

was

insufﬁcient.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm Wilson’s conviction 0n the underlying

charge of unlawful possession 0f a ﬁrearm, and t0 afﬁrm his sentence as a persistent Violator.

DATED this 22nd day of September, 2020.
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